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PROTECTING YOU
Simson L. Garfi nkel | Naval Postgraduate School
Complex document formats such as PDF and Microsoft’s Compound File Binary Format can contain 
information that is hidden but recoverable, as a result of text highlighting, cropping, or the embedding 
of high-resolution JPEG images. Private information can be released inadvertently if these fi les are 
distributed in electronic form. Simple experiments involving the creation of test documents can 
determine whether a particular program embeds hidden information.
I n April 2011, the UK Parliament posted an Adobe Acrobat PDF fi le on its public website detailing key 
vulnerabilities of UK nuclear submarines. Portions of 
the document had been removed by an offi  cial at the 
British Ministry of Defence, but the redactions were 
made incorrectly: the sensitive text was simply obscured 
with black boxes and could be recovered by copying the 
text from the PDF and pasting it into a word processor. 
A follow-up investigation by Th e Daily Telegraph found 
similar PDFs with secrets covered by black boxes on 
four other UK government websites.1
Leaks of sensitive information in PDFs are fre-
quently newsworthy, but hardly new. In October 2003, 
the US Department of Justice provided a report about 
its internal eff orts to increase racial diversity in response 
to a Freedom of Information Act request, with each of 
the report’s embarrassing fi ndings and recommenda-
tions blacked out. Journalist Russ Kick discovered that 
the black boxes could be removed easily2 and posted an 
unredacted version of the report on his website.
“I was kind of surprised,” Kick told Th e New York 
Times, “but we are talking about a government bureau-
cracy, so I wasn’t that surprised.”3
But it’s not just government bureaucracies that are 
at fault. Th e Times had made the same mistake when it 
published an alleged US intelligence report from the 
1950s on the paper’s website in 2000.4 Th e Washington 
Post made a similar mistake in 2002 when it posted a 
scan of the DC sniper’s demand lett er.5
Such failures might prove more common in the 
coming years as healthcare organizations, law fi rms, 
other businesses, and even users at home distribute 
information in electronic form aft er fi rst att empting to 
remove sensitive fi nancial or health information. Th ese 
failures result from the complexity of these fi le formats, 
including PDF and Microsoft  Compound File Binary 
fi le format (MS-CFB) used by the Microsoft  Offi  ce 
suite, interacting with the complex soft ware used to cre-
ate and redact these fi les. 
Fortunately, there are solutions available for redac-
tion, and there are good design patt erns that soft ware 
developers can implement to make such privacy failures 
less likely in the future.
PDF Privacy Leaks 
In the 1990s, Adobe created PDF, an electronic fi le 
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format that would let any modern computer view or 
print any document without needing to install soft-
ware or fonts (provided that a general-purpose PDF 
reader was installed). Adobe published the PDF speci-
fication and licensed the patents required for imple-
mentation. PDF soon became a common format for 
distributing born-digital documents, scans of paper 
documents, and even electronic forms. Its popularity 
came in part because PDF could distribute documents 
without the malware risk associated with the Micro-
soft Office file format.6 Today, numerous programs can 
create, display, and even edit PDF files, and the format 
has been adopted as an international standard (ISO 
32000-1:2008). 
PDF is based on Adobe’s PostScript Language, but it’s 
more specialized. Like PostScript, PDF has commands 
for drawing lines, embedding fonts, and displaying text. 
PDF also has direct support for document structure, 
a variety of image and video compression algorithms, 
electronic forms, digital rights management, and cryp-
tography. PDF even allows embedded Java Script for 
form validation and other kinds of automation. 
PDF’s rich support requires a complex reader, 
and such readers inevitably have flaws. Many of these 
flaws have been exploited by attackers using cleverly 
constructed documents.7 But, whereas PDF exploits 
depend on implementation errors, PDF privacy leaks 
result from properly formed files containing informa-
tion that’s invisible but readily extracted. 
Creating PDFs
Users typically create PDF files in one of two ways. One 
way is to generate a PDF directly from an application 
program by “printing” or exporting. PDF files created 
in this manner contain the actual characters and fonts 
rendered by the output device and have sharp, crisp 
letters; have text that can be selected and copied; and 
are searchable. These PDF files are considered accessi-
ble, because people who are vision impaired can read-
ily access the documents by enlarging the text or using 
screen readers.
A second way to create PDF files is to scan a paper 
document page by page, producing a PDF file that’s 
essentially a collection of photographs. Even when 
scanned at 300 dpi, the resulting document can appear 
pixelated, mushy, and difficult to read on a computer 
screen, because the PDF reader is displaying a photo-
graph of text rather than rendering the characters. (Ren-
dering allows the use of digital typographic techniques 
such as font hinting and antialiasing that significantly 
increase legibility.) Such text isn’t accessible—it can’t 
be selected, copied, searched, or read with a screen 
reader. These files tend to be 10 to 100 times larger than 
PDF files created with the first method. Nevertheless, 
many PDF files in circulation are scans of paper docu-
ments because the originals weren’t prepared using 
a computer, the original electronic files are no lon-
ger available, or the individuals who prepared the files 
didn’t have the necessary tools or training to create an 
accessible PDF file.
Adobe’s Acrobat Pro and other PDF processing pro-
grams can “recognize” text in scanned PDFs with an 
optical character recognition engine. Acrobat Pro can 
then modify the PDF file and place the recognized text 
in a second layer underneath the scanned image. The 
result is a scanned PDF that’s searchable but that pre-
serves the original image. The recognized text can even 
be copied into another program—an example of hid-
den text with a genuinely useful purpose! 
The PDF standard doesn’t distinguish between 
accessible and nonaccessible PDF files. From the point 
of view of the standard, a PDF is simply a file that con-
tains objects (for example, text drawing commands and 
fonts), a file structure that describes how and where the 
objects are stored in the file, a document structure that 
describes how the objects are used to create pages, and 
one or more content streams that describe how to dis-
play pages on the screen and how to print them. PDF’s 
power comes from its ability to compose these features 
in many different ways. 
Textual Privacy Leaks
Many of the PDF-enabled privacy leaks reported in the 
media appear to result from the improper use of Micro-
soft Word’s Text Highlight tool to hide information (see 
Figure 1). The interaction of features that results in pri-
vacy leaks isn’t specific to Word: it’s exhibited in all but 
one of the word processors tested for this article (Word, 
Apple Pages, Google Docs, and LaTeX). The standout 
was LibreOffice, which avoids the problem somewhat, 
Figure 1. Microsoft Word 2010’s Text Highlight tool can highlight text with 
different background colors. When the background is black, the text appears to 
be redacted but is still present.
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although it can still be manipulated to produce a PDF 
with hidden information.
In normal use, highlighting turns the background 
color of text from white to yellow to attract attention, 
similar to highlighting with a yellow marker. But word 
processors don’t use translucent ink. Instead, they high-
light text by first printing an opaque colored box, then 
printing black text on top of the box.
Privacy leaks can happen when the user changes the 
highlight color from yellow to black, resulting in black 
text printed on a black box. When the text is printed, 
Word still generates instructions to print both the box 
and the text (see Figure 2). The PDF file captures these 
instructions, and both can be recovered independently.
This behavior is particularly pernicious because the 
resulting text looks very similar to a document that has 
been redacted through the official procedures used by 
many governments—obscuring sensitive text with black 
boxes. Furthermore, there would likely be no significant 
privacy leak if the document was printed and distributed 
on paper. It’s only the distribution of the PDF created 
directly from the word processor with black boxes under 
black text that results in the privacy leak.
The easiest way to recover the hidden text is with 
Acrobat Reader’s Copy and Paste commands: copy 
the blacked-out text and paste into a word processor. A 
more dramatic demonstration is to open the PDF with 
an editing tool such as Adobe Illustrator or Inkscape. 
These tools understand PDF files’ internal structure 
and allow objects on each page to be manipulated indi-
vidually. Once in the editor, the user can select the back-
ground box and change its color from black to fuchsia 
(see Figure 3), resulting in the highlighting of text that 
was intended to be redacted.
“Highlighting” text with black isn’t the only source of 
textual privacy leaks. In the case of the redaction errors 
at The New York Times and The Washington Post, both 
papers apparently scanned a paper document, then 
drew black boxes on the scanned pages using Adobe 
Photoshop. By default, Photoshop draws boxes in a 
new layer, allowing the boxes to be moved after they’re 
drawn. The PDF format preserves these layers, allowing 
recovery of the original bitmaps. Of course, recovery 
isn’t what the editors intended. Both newspaper leaks 
would have been avoided if the Photoshop operator had 
“flattened” the layers before the PDF was made available 
on the newspaper’s Web server.5 Publishing material as 
a PNG or JPEG would also have avoided the leak, as 
those formats don’t support multiple layers.
Image Privacy Leaks
Private information can also leak in PDFs with a high-
resolution image or sensitive metadata. Thus, organiza-
tions and individuals that make PDFs containing JPEGs 
available for download should understand how PDFs 
are created and analyze them prior to release to ensure 
that the JPEGs don’t contain undesired information.
For example, when a Macintosh user drags a JPEG 
digital photograph from the desktop into a Word Mac 
2011 window and saves the file, Word embeds an exact 
copy of the JPEG inside the resulting Office Open XML 
(.docx) file. The .docx file is a ZIP file, and the original 
JPEG can be readily extracted using any “unzip” utility. 
Likewise, when Word produces a PDF from the docu-
ment, it embeds the original JPEG directly in the PDF 
as an object, along with instructions to scale, rotate, 
and possibly crop the JPEG. The original JPEG can be 
extracted using Acrobat Pro or an open source tool such 
as pdfimages. 
High-resolution JPEGs in PDFs can be both annoy-
ing and risky. The annoyance is that the files are typi-
cally much larger than needed: a typical high-resolution 
JPEG can be 3,000 pixels across and 3 Mbytes or larger 
in size. If the image is shrunk to two inches, the result 
is a super-resolution image with 1,500 dpi of informa-
tion (only 150 dpi are required for photographic-quality 
production).
The privacy risk is that super-resolution images can 
reveal information without the knowledge of the docu-
ment’s author, editor, or publisher. People in a photo 
who are too small to distinguish might be clearly iden-
tifiable if the photo is enlarged. High-resolution pho-
tographs of a person’s face can be used as a biometric. 
License plates, computer screens, and sometimes even 
papers on a desk can be enlarged and read. 
Embedded JPEGs can also contain Exchangeable 
image file format (Exif) metadata. Exif information can 
include the model and serial number of the camera that 
took the picture, the date and time it was taken, and 
GPS coordinates.
My analysis of desktop applications for this arti-
cle found that they were inconsistent in the way they 
embed JPEGs. Both Word and Apple Pages for Mac 
embed the unmodified JPEG in document files and 
Figure 2. The Text Highlight tool places a colored box underneath the text. 
When the box is the same color as the text, the text appears to be absent but is 
still present.
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PDFs generated from the Print menu. But when users 
invoke Pages’ Export PDF command, they can specify 
a quality of Good, Better, or Best. Choosing Good or 
Better causes an embedded JPEG to be converted to 
a lower-resolution image, removing the metadata in 
the process. Likewise, both Microsoft PowerPoint and 
Apple Keynote reduce the resolution of high-resolution 
JPEGs embedded in slide presentations exported as 
PDFs. Overall, it appears that the metadata stripping is 
an inadvertent side effect of creating a lower-resolution 
JPEG, rather than an intentional effort by application 
authors to strip privacy-sensitive information. 
Cropping Privacy Leaks
Cropping, masking, and rubberbanding can also result in 
privacy leaks, because many tools implement these oper-
ations by embedding the original object in a document 
file, then applying a postprocessing operation. As is the 
case with hidden-but-present text, special tools can undo 
the transformations and reveal the original content.
Programs are also inconsistent in alerting the user to 
the risk. Apple Preview 6.0.1 (distributed with MacOS 
10.8) displays an alert box warning “the content outside 
the selection is hidden in Preview, but you might be able 
to view it in other applications” when cropping, but not 
when a rectangular selection is rubberbanded on a PDF 
page and the object is copied and pasted into another 
document. However, both the cropping and the pasting 
operations result in the entire original PDF page being 
embedded in derived documents. Although evaluating 
the PDF commands and removing those that execute 
outside the displayed area is possible, such an imple-
mentation is significantly more complex. Adobe Acro-
bat XI Pro provides no warning at all.
To avoid this privacy leak, crop the image in a bit-
map manipulation program, such as the GNU Image 
Manipulation Program or Adobe Photoshop.
A PDF Privacy Experiment
To test whether word processing software will embed 
black-on-black text into a PDF, create such a file in a 
word processor, produce a PDF, and attempt to find 
the hidden text in the resulting file. Privacy-con-
scious users should test their tools to determine when 
the tools leak private information because software 
changes on a regular basis—far too fast for academic 
literature to keep up. 
For this article, I created six test documents using 
Microsoft Word (Mac and Windows), Google Docs, 
Apple Pages, LibreOffice, and LaTeX. Each document 
had a single line of text consisting of a number, the 
name of the product, the word “VIS#BLE” with a yel-
low highlighted number, the word “HID#DEN” with a 
black highlighted number, and the word “test.” (In this 
paragraph, I used the # symbol instead of a number, but 
in the experiment the number was changed for each 
word processor.) Thus, each file had two kinds of high-
lighted text—one that a naive user would expect to find 
in a file and one that such a user would not—and each 
instance of highlighted text was different, allowing the 
provenance of each piece of hidden text to be tracked if 
all were combined into a single file. 
All the programs I tested embedded highlighted text 
in the PDF file when the text was the same color as the 
background (see Figure 4). Readers are invited to ana-
lyze a PDF of this article downloaded from the IEEE 
website to see if the text is still present. This poses an 
important question: What is the correct behavior—to 
Figure 3. Black boxes created with the Text Highlight tool can be changed to a 
different color with PDF editing tools such as Inkscape.
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faithfully place the text and the same-colored box in the 
PDF file (what the user instructed), or to suppress the 
text (what the user sees on the screen and the printed 
page)? We will return to this question later.
Document Metadata Privacy Leaks
Metadata has come to mean data that describes other 
data, such as a title describing a document, a phone 
number describing a recorded audio call, or a date 
describing a table of scientific measurements. Docu-
ment metadata can be stored within or separate from 
the document. For example, file systems store extrinsic 
metadata, such as the creation and modification dates 
of each file.8 Some document file formats also contain 
internal or intrinsic metadata.
Both PDF and Microsoft Office support intrinsic 
document metadata including title, author, producer, 
creator, creation date, modification date, and keywords 
as well as user-defined metadata. We can find additional 
metadata, including copyright strings, color space 
names, file names, and the OS on which the file was cre-
ated, by examining the file with a hex editor.
Many metadata privacy leaks result from documents 
being made available in the Microsoft Office binary file 
format. The most significant leaks have resulted from 
embedded change tracking information.
Comments and Change Tracking Leaks
Microsoft introduced the ability to track changes in a 
document with Word 6 on Macintosh and Word 95 on 
Windows. Change tracking must be specially enabled 
on a per-document basis and is used widely. Once 
enabled, Word records every addition, deletion, and 
formatting change; the time of each change; and the 
responsible user. Word also lets users insert nonprint-
ing “comments” into the document.
With Word 2002, Microsoft introduced the ability 
to have “hidden” tracked changes, wherein the change 
tracking and comments are hidden from the screen and 
printed copy but the information is retained in the file. 
The changes can be viewed again by changing the file’s 
display mode from Final to Final: Show Markup (or 
Final Showing Markup on Word for Mac). 
As before, a complex document format that can con-
tain invisible information combined with the lack of obvi-
ous indicators alerting to the presence of hidden data can 
result in the inadvertent release of sensitive information.
Perhaps the most monetarily significant case involv-
ing such information pertained to a Microsoft Word 
file for an article about the drug rofecoxib (Vioxx) that 
was submitted to The New England Journal of Medicine 
in May 2000. The article reported that prescription 
rofecoxib caused fewer stomach ulcers than over-the-
counter naproxen in a study of 8,076 patients.9 (The US 
Food and Drug Administration had approved rofecoxib 
the previous year.)
Four years later, rofecoxib’s manufacturer Merck 
withdrew the drug from the market. A new study had 
shown that people taking rofecoxib had twice the inci-
dence of heart attack or stroke as people taking a sugar 
pill.10 Millions had been put at risk by using the drug, 
and an unknown number had died.
After Merck pulled rofecoxib from the market, the 
executive editor of The New England Journal of Medi-
cine reviewed the magazine’s paper files and discovered 
a floppy disk containing the original submitted version 
of the manuscript. The file’s hidden change tracking 
revealed that a table detailing the same kind of cardio-
vascular events had been deleted from the article just 
two days before it was submitted to the journal11 by a 
user named “Merck,”12 implying that the company itself 
had suppressed the information.
If the table had been published in 2000, prescribing 
doctors would have known that Vioxx carried a risk of 
heart attack, and the drug might never have become 
so popular.
Merck ultimately paid US$4.85 billion in 2007 to 
settle 27,000 lawsuits by those claiming to have been 
injured by rofecoxib; $950 million more was paid to 
settle criminal charges resulting from the company’s 
actions.13 A key piece of evidence was that original MS-
CFB file.
Other Office Metadata
MS-CFB files contain other information, including 
document author, keywords, the last time the file was 
printed, and path information for the previous 10 saves. 
Such metadata can reveal information that the docu-
ment’s author wishes to remain confidential.
For example, on 30 January 2003, UK Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair’s office released a Microsoft Word docu-
ment entitled “Iraq—Its Infrastructure of Concealment, 
Figure 4. Using the Text Highlight tool to create redacted text. (The misalignment 
of the Google Docs highlight appears to be a bug in Google’s software.)
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Deception and Intimidation,” claiming it was a previ-
ously classified document detailing the case for invad-
ing Iraq based on the country’s likely possession of 
weapons of mass destruction.
The Iraq document is somewhat infamous, because 
just days after its release, Glen Rangwala at Trinity Col-
lege determined that the document was largely plagia-
rized from documents that were freely available on the 
Internet.14 Based solely on the document’s content, 
this analysis caused considerable embarrassment to the 
UK government.
But the Iraq document also leaked sensitive meta-
data. In June 2003, computer security expert Richard 
Smith showed that the actual MS-CFB file revealed 
the servers inside the Home Office where the file had 
been saved, and even when the document was copied 
to a floppy disk—reportedly so that US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell could have a copy for his 5 Febru-
ary 2003 presentation at the UN (www.computerbytes 
man.com/privacy/blair.htm).
A recent study of 15 million Microsoft Office files 
available freely over the Internet found that 97 percent 
included significant metadata, and 19 percent included 
all 10 revision histories.15 The authors found that they 
could readily infer collaborators between corporations 
and the US military and could cross-correlate between 
document authors with Twitter accounts. “Our study 
raises major concerns about the risks involved in privacy 
leakage, due to metadata embedded in documents that 
are stored on public web servers,” the authors concluded.
Solutions
All the privacy leaks described here resulted from the 
ability of complex file formats to contain hidden infor-
mation that isn’t obviously visible when files are created 
or viewed.
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to 
address user interactions with computers that have 
potential security problems: train the users so that they 
don’t perform those actions, or design systems so that 
performing such actions is unlikely or impossible. 
Training
The computer industry has largely attempted to solve 
the problem of inadvertent disclosures by building 
manual redaction tools into some programs and train-
ing people to use those tools.
For example, Adobe Acrobat versions 8 and higher 
include a “redaction” tool. Acrobat redaction is a three-
step process that involves first marking the portions for 
redaction, applying the redaction, and then optionally 
removing metadata from the PDF file. The resulting file 
has black boxes in place of the removed text, but unlike 
boxes applied in a word processor or Photoshop, there’s 
no text underneath. Acrobat XI further allows users to 
annotate the black boxes with “exemption codes,” as 
might be necessary when redacting documents released 
as a result of a US Freedom of Information Act request 
or when preparing documents that are partially pro-
tected by the US Privacy Act. 
Likewise, Microsoft added a feature to its software to 
let users remove metadata. However, such removal must 
be performed explicitly. Microsoft’s “Crabby Office 
Lady” advice columnist Annik Stahl instructed users 
to remove tracked changes, comments, and hidden text 
before sending out documents such as résumés, annual 
reviews, and contract bids (http://office.microsoft. 
com/en-us/help/track-changes-in-word-don-t-let 
-them-track-you-HA001139412.aspx). 
Finally, the US National Security Agency Informa-
tion Assurance Directorate has published information 
on “Redacting with Confidence” that describes a vari-
ety of techniques for manual redaction (www.nsa.gov/
ia/_files/support/i733-028r-2008.pdf).
Software Modification
An alternative to training is to modify word processors 
to make these kinds of redaction errors less likely or 
even impossible.
For example, when a user of LibreOffice Writer 
changes the background of black text from white to 
black, the program simultaneously changes the text 
color from black to white. This is implemented with a 
special text color called “automatic” that changes the text 
Expert Online Courses 
— Just $49.00
Topics: Project Management, Software Security, Embedded 
Systems, and more.
www.computer.org/online-courses
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color “so the text is always distinguishable from the back-
ground” (www.libreoffice.org/get-help/ accessibility). 
The feature is designed to promote usability but has the 
side effect of requiring two steps to create black-on-black 
text—one to set the background and one to change the 
text color. The developers could go further and simply 
disallow text and background to be set to the same color 
as a safety measure.
Another solution, which could be implemented by 
every word processor, would be for the programs to 
detect when a letter is being printed on a same-color 
background and suppress the letter.
LibreOffice helps address the problem of super- 
resolution images in PDF files by bringing the issue to 
the users’ attention. LibreOffice’s PDF export dialog 
lets users set the JPEG compression quality and specify 
a final image resolution in dpi. This is superior to Apple’s 
PDF export dialog, which only allows users to specify 
an image quality of Good, Better, or Best but doesn’t 
explain that these settings might impact document size 
or privacy.
Experiments with LibreOffice’s PDF export func-
tion revealed that the program strips Exif information 
if it modifies the embedded JPEG but not otherwise. 
As before, the program’s privacy functionality appears 
to be a side effect of features designed to prevent files 
from becoming unnecessarily large rather than an 
explicit attempt to limit the spread of potentially sensi-
tive information. 
The current versions of both Windows and Macin-
tosh Word have privacy options for addressing sensitive 
metadata. One option, “remove personal information 
from this file on save,” removes the name of the com-
puter’s user from document metadata. Tracked changes 
aren’t removed, but the name is changed to “Author” 
and the modification time is removed (see Figure 5). 
A special Document Inspector claims to check for and 
remove 10 different kinds of hidden metadata, but the 
feature is buried beneath several layers of menus.
Disturbingly, the Microsoft Word user interface 
gives the impression that the program will also detect 
and eliminate hidden or invisible text. Tests show that 
these features don’t discover text on same-color back-
ground. Instead, the feature identifies text with the 
Microsoft font property Hidden, which prevents text 
from printing. The apparent confusion results from 
Microsoft’s use of the word “hidden” as a proper noun 
to describe a Microsoft feature, rather than as an adjec-
tive with its common meaning. 
As a result of the metadata privacy incidents dis-
cussed in this article and others, several software ven-
dors now offer enterprise metadata removal tools. For 
example, the PayneGroup’s Metadata Assistant can be 
configured to remove metadata from Word and PDF 
files on demand or automatically, such as when files 
are sent by email to another organization. Metadata 
removal can be performed on users’ computers or on 
a server. A typical customer might be a law firm that 
would configure its outbound mail server to automati-
cally strip metadata from email attachments. Accord-
ing to the American Bar Association, 17 states now 
hold that attorneys have an ethical requirement to 
exercise “reasonable care” in removing metadata prior 
to transmitting documents.16 Of those states, six hold 
that recipients of documents with metadata may be 
exploited, nine hold that such practice is ethically pro-
hibited, and two hold that the situation is case specific. 
A 2010 survey by the American Bar Association found 
that 59 percent of the respondents’ firms had some kind 
of specialized metadata removal software available, up 
from 46 percent the year before.
B oth PDF and Microsoft Office files can contain information that’s essentially invisible to the indi-
vidual preparing the electronic document yet easily 
extracted by a recipient. Today, a significant number 
of documents available on the Internet for download 
contain significant metadata of all kinds. To address 
this problem, vendors and users have largely relied on 
increased training and specialty tools.
A better approach would be to modify tools so that 
the underlying data model is in line with what’s pre-
sented in the user interface—that is, by making it harder 
for users to produce documents with hidden informa-
tion. In the absence of such redesign, embarrassing data 
leaks are sure to continue. 
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